Prior Authorization Burden: What a Manufacturer Can Actually Do
Prior authorization burden is the administrative work that a payer's approval requirement transfers onto a prescriber's office and a patient. A manufacturer cannot change the payer's coverage criteria or the adjudication decision, though it can change almost everything about how that work gets done. That distinction carries the whole of the operating answer, and most writing on this subject never reaches it. Advocacy asks the payer to stop. Operating guidance asks what already sits inside a manufacturer's control.
Institutions rarely distribute work to whoever is best equipped to absorb it. They distribute it to whoever cannot refuse. Prior authorization is a legitimate utilization management mechanism, and that belongs at the front of any honest account of it. Payers use it to confirm that an expensive therapy is being used as indicated, which is a reasonable thing for the party carrying the cost to want established.
The problem was never that the mechanism exists. The problem is that the burden of operating it has been distributed to the two parties least equipped to absorb it. Those two parties are a prescriber's office and a patient. Neither of them designed the process, and neither of them holds any authority over how it runs.
A second gap sits underneath the first and does more damage. No party in the chain is accountable for the outcome of the process as a whole. A payer is accountable for an adjudication, a practice for clinic throughput, a hub for case closure, and a manufacturer for prescriptions written. Nobody is accountable for whether the patient reaches the therapy her physician selected.
Why the mechanism is legitimate and the burden is not
A payer reviewing a high cost therapy against its indication is doing something defensible. Specialty products carry real cost exposure, and some share of prescribing does fall outside the evidence supporting it. A mechanism that checks for that is a reasonable instrument rather than a hostile one.
Where the design turns punitive is in volume, repetition and opacity. A single authorization is manageable for a practice that has done one before. The same request arriving from many payers, each with its own criteria, portal and documentation standard, becomes a staffing problem rather than a clinical one. Every individual step can be defended while the sequence as a whole remains impossible to navigate.
The patient experiences none of that detail and all of its consequence. She was told a therapy had been chosen for her, and then nothing happened for a period nobody could specify. A person with no visibility into a process will often conclude that the process has ended.
What the evidence actually shows
The public evidence here is unusually clear for a commercial topic. A 2026 JAMA study summarized by Johns Hopkins found insurer rejections reached 40.7 percent of initial brand name attempts in 2024. The same study found that 48.4 percent of those rejected prescriptions were never followed by a fill of that drug or anything in its class within ninety days. Almost half of those rejections turn out to be an ending rather than a stage.
The view from inside the practice supplies the other half of the picture. A 2024 AMA physician survey found 93 percent of physicians reported that prior authorization delays care, and 82 percent reported that it at least sometimes leads to patients abandoning treatment. Those are the people operating the mechanism daily, reporting on its effects rather than its intent. Neither figure implicates anyone's competence, and the two together describe a process working as designed while producing an outcome none of its parts was asked to prevent.
Is any of this friction legally required?
The compliance explanation deserves examination, because it is the one most often offered. Regulation in this industry governs claims rather than burden. The rules are exacting about what a company may say regarding efficacy, safety and comparative benefit, and close to silent on how long an office spends assembling a payer submission. Almost none of the friction inside an authorization is required by law.
That changes the category of the problem. Constraints written into law get worked around. Constraints nobody owns get picked up by whichever party decides the outcome matters to it. This process sits in the second category, which is a more hopeful finding than it first sounds.
The six hurdles that turn burden into drag
Authorization sits on the Path to Fulfill, the stretch between a clinical decision and a medicine in a patient's hand. Friction on that stretch accumulates as several distinct obstacles, and six of them recur often enough that I name them. Administrative burden is the volume of work transferred to a practice or a household. Disconnected handoffs are the points where context stops traveling between parties.
Lack of visibility is the absence of any single view of where a case currently sits. Fragmented support describes a patient helped by several programs and served by none of them. Poor escalation is what happens when an exception meets a queue instead of a person. Process complexity is the compound effect of the other five arriving at once.
Authorization is the one process on which all six tend to appear together. Friction is an economic variable, and accumulated friction becomes commercial drag. A practice that meets all six will, rationally enough, begin steering toward products that do not demand the whole sequence. That steering rarely appears in any report as a consequence of burden.
What a manufacturer controls and what it does not
The useful question is narrower than the debate usually allows. Two things sit outside a manufacturer's control entirely, which are the payer's coverage criteria and the adjudication decision itself. Everything else about the operation of this process is addressable, and most of it is addressable without anyone's permission. Confusing those two categories produces the two standard failures.
The first failure is lobbying when the work to be done is operating. A company convinced that the criteria are the whole problem directs its energy at policy, which may be worthwhile and will not change a single case this quarter. The second failure is giving up, on the reasoning that none of this belongs to us. Both conclusions follow from the same category error.
Five moves that sit inside that boundary
The first is documentation quality. A manufacturer can equip an office with clinical support material that matches what payers actually ask for, rather than material built for a promotional purpose and repurposed under pressure. Completeness at first submission is often the largest single determinant of how long a case takes.
The second is the time an office spends assembling that material. Hours of clinic staff time per case are a cost the manufacturer's requirements caused and the practice absorbs. Reducing those hours is a design exercise in forms, templates, prefilled fields and criteria mapping, and it needs no external approval. Practices remember which products are cheap to prescribe administratively, and that memory outlasts any campaign.
The third is visibility into where a case currently sits. A practice that can see status stops making the calls that consume its afternoon, and a patient who can see status stops concluding that nothing is happening. Visibility is one of the six Consumer-Grade conditions for a reason, because a person's tolerance for waiting depends largely on knowing what she is waiting for.
The fourth is a named owner for exceptions. Most authorization processes handle the standard case adequately and collapse on the unusual one, which is where the clinically urgent cases tend to concentrate. An escalation lottery, in which an exception travels wherever the last person sent it, is the arrangement I find most often rather than a deliberate one. Replacing it means naming a person, giving that person authority, and publishing how a practice reaches them.
The fifth is measurement, and it is the one most often missing. A manufacturer that cannot state how many of its authorizations reach approval, and how long they take, has no basis for improving either. Approval rate and cycle time are the two numbers that turn this process into something managed rather than endured.
How the burden becomes a commercial number
Burden stays a complaint until somebody expresses it in the currency a business review already reads. The Realization Rate is realized value divided by earned value, which reports the share of what the science earned that actually became therapy. Customer Value at Risk is earned value multiplied by one minus that rate, which states the shortfall as money. Authorization failure tends to be among the larger contributors to that shortfall.
What makes the number persuasive is that no competitor takes the value. An unresolved authorization frequently does not move the patient to a rival therapy, because it removes the therapy from her life altogether. That pattern is what I mean by value leakage, and its distinguishing feature is that nobody gains from it. The wider accounting of it is the subject of a practice note on the value lost between script and patient.
Why nobody in this chain is failing
Everyone involved here is doing their own job competently. The payer reviews against published criteria. The practice triages against finite clinic hours. The hub closes cases against a defined service level, and the manufacturer promotes against a share target.
The failure sits above all of those jobs, at a level where nobody holds a mandate. No role in the current arrangement is defined as accountable for whether a clinically justified decision becomes a therapy. That absence is structural rather than cultural, which means it responds to design rather than to exhortation. Design gaps can be closed in ways that character gaps never can.
What closes it is an operating loop rather than a program. Capturing the signal when a case stalls, classifying the barrier, assigning an owner, intervening, measuring progression and learning from the result is the sequence, and the frontline usually sees the signal first. In my experience a field colleague knows which practice has quietly stopped submitting authorizations weeks before fill data reveals the same pattern. The standard that loop has to meet was set outside this industry, by every other service in a patient's life.
Key Takeaways
- Prior authorization is a legitimate utilization management mechanism, and the problem is how the burden of operating it has been distributed.
- The two parties least equipped to absorb that burden, a prescriber's office and a patient, are the two now carrying most of it.
- The payer's coverage criteria and the adjudication decision sit outside a manufacturer's control, while almost everything about the operation of the process sits inside it.
- Documentation completeness, assembly time, case visibility, a named exception owner and measurement are the five moves available without anyone's permission.
- Regulation in this industry governs claims rather than burden, which leaves almost none of this friction legally required.
- No role in the current arrangement is accountable for whether a clinically justified decision becomes a therapy, which makes this a design gap.
Diagnostic Questions to Consider
- Name the single executive accountable for whether an authorization on your largest brand reaches approval.
- State your current approval rate and your median cycle time for authorizations on that brand.
- Estimate the hours of clinic staff time your access requirements consume per case, supported by evidence rather than assumption.
- Describe what happens to an urgent exception today, including who receives it and how a practice reaches that person.
- List which parts of your authorization documentation exist because a payer requires them and which exist because nobody has reviewed them.
Closing Reflection
This process consumes an extraordinary amount of capable human effort to produce an outcome nobody wanted. Clinic staff spend afternoons on portals, hub agents work queues conscientiously, and payer reviewers apply criteria as written. The effort is real, and the result is often a patient who concluded, reasonably enough, that her therapy was never going to happen.
The honest reading is that the mechanism is defensible and its operation is unowned. A manufacturer that accepts the first half of that sentence and acts on the second half has far more room to move than most assume. The payer's criteria will stay where they are for now, while the time, the clarity, the visibility and the ownership are all available this quarter.
What this asks for is a company willing to treat burden as an economic variable rather than as an industry grievance. Measured that way, authorization stops being a policy topic and becomes a yield question with a named owner and a number attached. That is a change in category rather than a change in effort, and it is available to any organization that decides to make it.
About the Author
Wayne Simmons is the founder of The Customer Excellence AGENCY and the author of The Customer Excellence Enterprise (Wiley, 2024). He is founding faculty of the MS in Customer Experience Management at Michigan State University's Broad College of Business. He led global customer excellence in Pfizer's first Chief Marketing Organization and in Bayer's Customer Powerhouse.
The Customer Excellence Agency: Advancing the Pursuit of Excellence in Service of Science.







