Why Pharma CX Programs Fail, and What I Did About Mine
I inherited a customer experience program that looked healthy and could not prove it mattered.
It had everything the playbook asks for. A relationship survey. A transactional survey. An advocacy score reported to leadership every quarter. Journey maps on the wall. Budget, headcount, executive sponsorship. By the standards of the discipline it was a success, and my job was to scale it.
I retired it instead. The surveys went first, then the score. What follows is why, because the failure was not peculiar to that company and you are probably funding a version of it right now.
What does a failing pharma CX program look like from the inside?
Not like failure. That is the problem.
Response rates hold. The score drifts a point one way, a point back. The deck gets better every quarter. People are proud of it, and they should be, because the work is real and the intent is good. Most of the people running your CX program care more about your customers than almost anyone else in the building.
The tell is a single question in the quarterly review. Someone senior asks what you want the business to do differently as a result. If the honest answer is a list of improvements that nobody outside the CX team is accountable for, you do not have a program. You have a reporting habit.
Ask it at your next review. Watch what happens in the room.
Why could it not prove anything?
Three reasons, and the first two are built into the instruments.
Sentiment is not your constraint. The surveys measured how people felt about us. In pharma, how a physician feels about your company is a long way from whether her patient gets your drug, and the distance between those two things is where your money goes. Fred Reichheld made the original case for the advocacy score in the Harvard Business Review in 2003, and it was a good case for the industries he studied. Bain's own later work is more careful than the way the industry quotes it. Their published figure is that relative score differences explain anywhere from 10% to 70% of the variation in subsequent revenue growth. Read that range again. In a different paper the firm put it plainly, calling goodwill "a necessary but insufficient condition for generating revenue growth."
Nobody owned the answer. A score tells you something is wrong somewhere. It does not tell you which handoff broke, who fixes it, by when, or whether the fix held. Our program could raise an issue. It could not assign one.
The third reason is the one that took me longest to see. The thing that was actually failing was happening somewhere we were not looking.
What were we not watching?
The interval between the prescription and the patient.
Look at what the numbers say about that interval now. A 2026 study in JAMA, summarized by Johns Hopkins, found insurer rejections of brand name prescriptions rose from 24.3% of initial attempts in 2018 to 40.7% in 2024. Of those rejected scripts, 48.4% were never followed by a fill of that drug or anything in its class within 90 days. The American Medical Association's latest survey has 82% of physicians saying prior authorization at least sometimes leads patients to abandon treatment, and 93% saying it delays care. IQVIA data reported by Managed Healthcare Executive puts abandonment at 61% once a prescription costs more than $250.
None of that showed up in our survey. It could not. We were asking people how the relationship felt while patients were failing to start therapy, and the two data sets never met. We named that gap value leakage later, once there was something to name.
Does the instrument work with physicians at all?
Not well, and the reason is structural rather than methodological.
Your physician does not think of herself as your customer. She did not choose your brand in the way a consumer chooses a bank. She has a patient in front of her and a formulary behind her. As I put it to CXM last year, doctors do not go around asking about loyalty. Scoring her affection for your company measures something real and almost entirely beside the point.
That deserves its own treatment and it will get one. For now take the narrow version: an instrument built to predict repeat purchase in a voluntary market will underperform in a market where the buyer, the payer and the user are three different people.
What replaced it?
Progression, measured brand by brand and stage by stage.
Script to start conversion. Time to therapy. The stall points where patients wait and how long they wait there. Persistence at 90 days. Barrier resolution rate and speed. Realized value against the value the brand had already earned. Those measures have two properties the old ones lacked. Someone can own each of them, and each of them moves money.
The discipline that sits on top of those measures is what we now call Customer Excellence, and the standard it is built to meet is Consumer-Grade. Neither is a rebrand of what I shut down. The old program asked how customers felt. The new one asks whether they got what the science promised, and what it cost you when they did not.
Would you build a pharma CX program again?
Not as a program. That is the part I would say differently if I were starting over.
A program has a budget line, a team and an end date, which means it can be defunded without anything else changing. An operating discipline sits inside commercial, owns handoffs, and shows up in how brands are run. The first is easy to approve and easy to kill. The second is hard to approve and hard to kill, which is the point.
The industry wide version of this gap is still open. Deloitte's 2025 research found that only 28% of HCPs believe pharma's engagement strategies meet their needs, while 82% of life sciences executives say they are satisfied with those same strategies. Two thirds of your customers disagree with you, and your instruments are not telling you.
Key takeaways
- A pharma CX program can look healthy on every internal measure and still prove nothing about the business.
- Sentiment instruments measure something real that is not your constraint, and Bain's own range on score to growth runs from 10% to 70%.
- Scores raise issues. They cannot assign them, which is why nothing changes.
- The failure you need to see happens after the prescription, where most CX programs never look.
- Progression measures work because each one has an owner and each one moves money.
Questions to ask your leadership team
- At your next CX review, ask what the business should do differently as a result. Who in the room is accountable for doing it?
- If your advocacy score rose four points next quarter, what would you expect to see in your brand numbers, and when?
- How many of last quarter's prescriptions became treated patients, and does your CX reporting contain that number anywhere?
- Which of your experience measures has a named owner outside the CX team?
- If the program were defunded tomorrow, what in your commercial operating model would change?
About the author
Wayne Simmons is the founder of The Customer Excellence AGENCY and the author of The Customer Excellence Enterprise (Wiley, 2024). He is founding faculty of the MS in Customer Experience Management at Michigan State University's Broad College of Business. He led global customer excellence in Pfizer's first Chief Marketing Organization and in Bayer's Customer Powerhouse. Related reading: Pharma customer experience, why it stalls and what replaces it, What is value leakage in pharma? and What is Customer Excellence in pharma?







