Why BMS Discounted Sotyktu by 86% and Eliquis by 40%
Bristol Myers Squibb ran two of these at once, in two different categories, at two very different discounts. The gap between 40% and 86% is the most instructive number published in this entire wave, and almost nobody has asked why it exists.
It is not generosity in one case and restraint in the other. It is market position, expressed as arithmetic, and once you can read it you can work out what your own cash price would have to be.
What did BMS actually do?
Announced two direct channels inside ten weeks, for two medicines with nothing in common, and handed you a controlled experiment in the process.
The first went live in September 2025. A joint announcement with Pfizer offered Eliquis to uninsured, underinsured and self pay patients at more than 40% below list, bought through Eliquis 360 Support and shipped to all fifty states and Puerto Rico. Christopher Boerner, board chair and chief executive of Bristol Myers Squibb, said the program "passes more savings directly to patients." The release notes more than 15 million Americans have been prescribed the medicine since launch.
The second was announced on 25 September 2025. BMS Patient Connect launches in January 2026 offering Sotyktu, an oral treatment for moderate to severe plaque psoriasis, at more than 80% below list. Boerner framed it as making medicines "more accessible and affordable for patients living with serious conditions."
Fierce Pharma got the actual figures. List price $6,828 for a thirty day supply. Cash price $950. BMS puts the discount at 86%.
Hold those two numbers next to each other. Eliquis, roughly 40% off a list around $606 a month. Sotyktu, 86% off $6,828. Same company, same quarter, same stated rationale.
Why is one discount 40% and the other 86%?
Because the two channels are doing entirely different jobs, and the discount is set by competitive position rather than by how much the company wants to help.
Eliquis is an incumbent with enormous installed volume and most of its business running through coverage. A deep cash discount there would undercut the covered book for very little gain, because the patients who need it are a thin slice of fifteen million. Forty percent is a retention and goodwill instrument sized not to disturb the main business.
Sotyktu sits in a crowded psoriasis market against several well established biologics. It is the challenger. For a challenger, a cash channel is not a goodwill gesture, it is a share acquisition instrument, and 86% is what it costs to make one viable.
Neither of those is a criticism. Both are the rational move from where each brand actually stands, which is exactly why copying the percentage rather than the logic will produce a number that makes no sense for you.
Here is the rule worth taking away. Your defensible cash discount is a function of how much covered business you would cannibalize set against how much new volume you could win. Work out both sides before anyone in your company picks a percentage.
What does $950 buy that $3,571 does not?
A price a real patient might actually pay, in a disease where a competitor just demonstrated the opposite.
Novartis set a cash price for Cosentyx in the same indication. Managed Healthcare Executive reported the Cosentyx list at $7,936.48 a month and the discount at 55%, which leaves roughly $3,571. Sotyktu arrives at $950.
Same disease. Roughly a quarter of the price. That comparison has not appeared anywhere in the trade press and it is the single most useful fact in this wave.
The difference is not that one company cares more. Cosentyx is Novartis's top selling US product, so an 86% cash price would compete with its own covered revenue. Sotyktu has far less covered revenue to protect. Position sets the floor, and I set out the Cosentyx case in what Novartis is testing.
What it means for a patient is more interesting than what it means for either company. At $950 a month the cash channel becomes a genuine option during a deductible phase or a coverage gap. At $3,571 it mostly is not. The arithmetic decides whether a program is an offer or a gesture, and your patients will work that out faster than your brand team does.
Which path does this solve?
Affordability inside one path, and both releases are notably quiet about everything else.
We model the distance between your science and your patient as three sequential paths. The Path to Prescribe , where a patient is identified, diagnosed, referred and a clinician decides. The Path to Fulfill , where that decision survives coverage, prior authorization, cost and dispensing. The Path to Adhere , where the patient stays on therapy long enough to get the benefit the trial demonstrated.
Read both announcements for what they promise and what they do not. Discounted pricing, direct shipping, transparency into cost, patient support resources. Neither mentions telehealth. Neither mentions benefit verification or prior authorization help for the patients who do have coverage.
That is a price and logistics solution on the Path to Fulfill. It is real and it is bounded.
Now consider Sotyktu specifically. It is a daily oral medicine for a chronic condition, which means the Path to Adhere is not a secondary concern, it is where the value is won or lost over years. A monthly shipment is a useful start and it is not an adherence program.
The burden on the path these platforms do not touch is heavy and documented. In the American Medical Association's latest survey, 93% of physicians said prior authorization delays care and 82% said it at least sometimes leads patients to abandon treatment.
Why does one company have two front doors?
Because each brand built its own, which is the most transferable finding here and the least comfortable.
Eliquis runs through Eliquis 360 Support. Sotyktu will run through BMS Patient Connect. The BMS release does not say the Eliquis program moves onto the new platform, and it describes Patient Connect as somewhere other medicines may be added later.
So a company with two direct programs has two addresses, two sets of eligibility rules and two support experiences. Each one is sensible on its own terms, and nobody set out to build a maze.
That is what brand level ownership produces. When each brand funds its own access solution, the patient inherits the organization chart, and no function is accountable for the whole distance. I have argued the structural fix in who should own customer experience in a pharma company.
Check your own portfolio against this before you feel superior to anyone. Count your patient support addresses, your copay programs, your hubs and your portals. Then ask who in your company could tell a newly diagnosed patient which one is hers.
Independent observers expect the next move here to be routing rather than pricing. In Pharmaceutical Commerce, Chip Parkinson of Gifthealth expects platforms to stop defaulting to cash pay and instead send each patient down whichever path, cash or insurance, is cheapest and fastest. If that is where this lands, the durable asset is the routing logic rather than the discount.
What is actually driving this wave?
Policy pressure on net price, not a conversion to customer thinking.
This matters to how you read every one of these announcements, including the ones still to come. Fierce Pharma notes that the Sotyktu move followed letters sent in July 2025 from President Trump to seventeen pharmaceutical chief executives urging more direct to consumer sales.
Programs like these have now arrived at six large manufacturers inside two years. Every one is a pricing and channel decision made by commercial leadership. Not one began inside an experience function.
That is not cynicism and it is not a complaint. Your own planning should account for it, because a wave driven by price transparency will not, by itself, fix anything on the two paths where your earned value actually leaks.
What should you take from it?
Two rules and one number.
The first rule is that your cash discount is set by position. Cannibalization against acquisition, worked out brand by brand, before anyone picks a percentage. BMS has shown you both ends of that calculation inside one company.
The second rule is that a direct channel solves a seam, not a system. Price and shipping sit on the Path to Fulfill. Your Path to Prescribe and your Path to Adhere are where most of the remaining money is, and no portal reaches them.
The number is what arrives. A 2026 JAMA study summarized by Johns Hopkins found insurer rejections reached 40.7% of initial brand name attempts in 2024. Of those rejected scripts, 48.4% were never followed by a fill of that drug or anything in its class within 90 days.
So find your gate, name the seams, give each one an owner, and measure what arrives against what you earned. The money in that interval is value leakage. The share of earned decisions that becomes therapy is your Realization Rate. The bar your patients already apply is Consumer-Grade, the discipline that recovers the value is Customer Excellence, and the whole argument sits in the future of the pharma commercial model.
BMS has handed the industry a free lesson in pricing logic. The question it leaves on your desk is which job your channel would be doing, and whether anyone has done the subtraction.
Key takeaways
- BMS announced two direct channels ten weeks apart at radically different discounts, 40% off Eliquis and 86% off Sotyktu, and the gap is explained by competitive position rather than intent.
- Sotyktu arrives at $950 a month against a $6,828 list, roughly a quarter of the cash price Novartis set for Cosentyx in the same indication.
- Your defensible cash discount is cannibalization of covered business set against new volume won, calculated brand by brand before anyone picks a number.
- Both programs solve price and shipping on the Path to Fulfill. Neither mentions telehealth, benefit verification or prior authorization help, and neither touches the Path to Adhere.
- One company now has two front doors, because each brand built its own, which is what happens when no function owns the whole distance to the patient.
Questions to ask your leadership team
- For your lead brand, what would a cash price have to be before a real patient used it, and what would that cost you in covered revenue?
- Is your brand the incumbent protecting a covered book or the challenger buying share, and does your access strategy match that answer?
- How many separate patient support addresses does your portfolio have, and who could name them all?
- Of the barriers between your prescription and your patient, how many are price and how many are paperwork, coordination and persistence?
- If a competitor priced direct at a quarter of your cash price tomorrow, what would you do, and who would decide?
About the author
Wayne Simmons is the founder of The Customer Excellence AGENCY and the author of The Customer Excellence Enterprise (Wiley, 2024). He is founding faculty of the MS in Customer Experience Management at Michigan State University's Broad College of Business. He led global customer excellence in Pfizer's first Chief Marketing Organization and in Bayer's Customer Powerhouse. Related reading: What Novartis is testing with Cosentyx direct, What is Realization Rate? and The future of the pharma commercial model







