What Novartis Is Testing With Cosentyx Direct
Novartis did not copy Lilly. It ran a structurally similar play in a category where the arithmetic cannot work the same way. That makes Cosentyx the first of these moves that is actually transferable to most of the brands you run.
Lilly and Novo removed the payer from a transaction patients could plausibly fund themselves. A covered specialty biologic does not allow that, and Novartis said so in its own language. The interesting part is what the company is testing instead.
What did Novartis actually do?
Set a cash price for a specialty biologic and called it an experiment.
The media release of 29 September 2025 announced a direct to patient platform effective 1 November, offering Cosentyx to cash paying patients at 55% off list. The company described the price as one that "reflects the average savings that insurers and pharmacy benefit managers receive."
Two phrases in that release are worth more than the platform itself. Novartis called the program a proof of concept for selling specialty medicines directly. Victor Bultó, President US for Novartis, called the launch "a first step."
Note the restraint. Those are the words of a company running a test rather than announcing a solution, and you should read them literally rather than as modesty.
The release also disclosed something easier to miss. Novartis is exploring a direct to business model that would sell Cosentyx, and possibly other medicines, to large employers.
Why does the arithmetic work differently here?
Because 55% off a very large number is still a very large number.
Do the subtraction yourself. Managed Healthcare Executive reported the July 2025 list price at $7,936.48 a month for a self injection package. Take 55% off and you are at roughly $3,600 a month, which is about $43,000 a year.
That is not a consumer price. No patient with a chronic inflammatory condition funds that out of pocket across years, which means the cash channel here is not aimed at the population a GLP-1 cash price reaches.
So who is it for? A narrow slice, and naming it precisely is the whole value of the case. Patients inside a high deductible phase, where $3,600 beats the full list they would otherwise face. Patients between coverage. Then, if the direct to business idea develops, employers who would rather buy at net than through a rebate chain.
Novartis is not deleting the payer. It is testing whether the net price can reach the buyer without the intermediary, which is a different and considerably more ambitious question.
So what is actually being tested?
Net price transparency, not channel convenience.
This is where the Cosentyx move separates from the two before it. LillyDirect shortened a route. Novartis is pricing against the rebate system and saying out loud that the discount approximates what insurers and pharmacy benefit managers already receive.
Read that as a positioning statement about where the money currently goes. Whether it holds commercially is unproven, and the company has not claimed otherwise.
The direct to business thread is the one I would watch. Selling a specialty biologic to a large employer at net price targets the pharmacy benefit manager rather than the pharmacy. If that works it changes more about your market than any patient portal will.
Context from Pharmaceutical Commerce is useful here. Chip Parkinson, CEO of Gifthealth, points out that specialty medicines are more than half of drug spend while reaching only about 2% of patients. That concentration is why specialty is the next place these models go, and why the economics are harder when they arrive.
Which path does this solve?
One seam of one path, and naming the boundary is what makes the case usable to you.
We model the distance between science and patient as three sequential paths. The Path to Prescribe , where a patient is identified, diagnosed, referred and a clinician decides. The Path to Fulfill , where that decision survives coverage, prior authorization, cost and dispensing. The Path to Adhere , where the patient stays on therapy long enough to get the benefit the trial demonstrated.
Cosentyx direct addresses affordability inside the Path to Fulfill, for a defined population. That is a real contribution. It is also a narrow one, and the narrowness is the part you can learn from.
Consider what a specialty biologic actually puts a patient through, and how much of it a cash price leaves untouched. Benefit verification, prior authorization, specialty pharmacy coordination, injection training, refill logistics.
The published burden on that path is heavy. In the American Medical Association's latest survey, 93% of physicians said prior authorization delays care and 82% said it at least sometimes leads patients to abandon treatment.
The Path to Adhere is untouched entirely. For a self injected biologic taken over years, that is where most of the earned value actually sits, which is a statement about the structure of the problem rather than about Novartis.
What does the four door problem tell you?
That for a covered biologic the binding constraint has quietly stopped being price and become finding the right door.
Read the affordability routes Novartis lists in its own release, all of them legitimate and well intended. Eligible commercially insured patients may pay as little as $0 through a copay program. Patients appealing an initial coverage denial may receive the medicine at no cost for up to two years. Uninsured or government insured patients meeting income criteria may receive it free through the Novartis Patient Assistance Foundation. Cash paying patients may now buy at 55% off list.
Four doors. Each one solves a real problem for a real population. None of them is the wrong answer.
Now put yourself in the chair of a newly diagnosed patient, or the office manager helping her. Which door applies to you depends on your insurance status, your income, whether you have been denied yet, and where you sit against your deductible. Nobody in the system is accountable for telling you which one you are standing in front of.
That is an unowned problem, it is structural rather than anybody's failing, and it is almost certainly true of your portfolio too. Gartner found 62% of customer service channel transitions are high effort in industries that can watch the transition happen. You cannot watch yours, and you have more doors than they do.
Adding a door improves the menu. It does not reduce the effort of choosing, and effort is what determines whether a decision your science already won turns into therapy.
Did it work?
Nobody has published a number, and nearly a year after launch that absence is the finding.
Be careful what you conclude from it. No uptake figure has been released for Cosentyx direct, which is not evidence of failure and not evidence of success. It is evidence that the category is being run without public measurement, which is exactly the condition in which everyone copies everyone.
The useful independent read is directional. Parkinson describes the industry as "moving past pilot mode" and expects platforms to stop defaulting to cash pay, instead routing each patient down whichever path, cash or insurance, is cheapest and fastest. If that is where this goes, the enduring asset is the routing logic rather than the price.
There is also a regulatory overhang any company in this space inherits. The same reporting notes that the HHS Office of Inspector General has sought public feedback on a full safe harbor for direct to patient arrangements, with rulemaking possibly advancing in 2027. If you are planning one of these, design for a rule that does not exist yet.
What should you take from it?
That price is one seam of one path, and your gate is probably somewhere else.
Three of these moves have now run inside two years, and the industry pattern is clear enough to name. Managed Healthcare Executive records AstraZeneca at up to 70% off list for two products and Bristol Myers Squibb at more than 80% off Sotyktu's list from January 2026. Every one of them is a pricing and channel decision made by commercial leaders. Not one of them began as an experience program.
That is the transferable lesson, and it is the same one the Lilly and Novo cases produced. These companies found the specific structural gate between their science and their patients, then changed the structure rather than improving the experience around it.
Your gate will be different. For most covered specialty brands it is the interval between the prescription and the first dose, and the quiet attrition after it. A 2026 JAMA study summarized by Johns Hopkins found insurer rejections reached 40.7% of initial brand name attempts in 2024. Of those rejected scripts, 48.4% were never followed by a fill of that drug or anything in its class within 90 days.
So find your gate, name the seams, put an owner on each one, and measure what arrives. The money sitting in that interval is value leakage. The share of earned decisions that becomes therapy is your Realization Rate. The bar your patients are already applying is Consumer-Grade, the discipline that recovers the value is Customer Excellence, and the whole argument sits in the future of the pharma commercial model.
Novartis is testing the hardest version of this in the open. The question it leaves on your desk is which of your four doors a patient is standing in front of right now, and who in your company knows.
Key takeaways
- Cosentyx direct is a net price experiment rather than a channel convenience play, and Novartis describes it as a proof of concept rather than a solution.
- Fifty five percent off a list price Managed Healthcare Executive put at $7,936.48 a month still leaves roughly $43,000 a year, so the cash channel reaches a narrow population rather than a consumer one.
- The direct to business thread matters more than the patient platform, because selling at net to large employers targets the pharmacy benefit manager rather than the pharmacy.
- It addresses affordability inside the Path to Fulfill and leaves benefit verification, prior authorization, specialty coordination and the entire Path to Adhere where they were.
- For a covered biologic with four affordability doors, your binding constraint is orientation rather than price, and no function owns that.
Questions to ask your leadership team
- How many affordability routes does your lead brand have, and who tells a patient which one applies to her?
- If you set a cash price at the average rebate you currently give away, what would it be, and who would object internally?
- Would a large self insured employer buy your brand at net, and has anyone in your company ever asked one?
- Of the barriers on your Path to Fulfill, how many are price and how many are paperwork and coordination?
- What share of earned decisions on your brand becomes therapy at twelve months, and when did you last look?
About the author
Wayne Simmons is the founder of The Customer Excellence AGENCY and the author of The Customer Excellence Enterprise (Wiley, 2024). He is founding faculty of the MS in Customer Experience Management at Michigan State University's Broad College of Business. He led global customer excellence in Pfizer's first Chief Marketing Organization and in Bayer's Customer Powerhouse. Related reading: The future of the pharma commercial model, What is Realization Rate? and How to measure customer experience in pharma







